27 dicembre 2023

Educazione americana, di Fabrizio Gatti

In an era where geopolitical truths are often shrouded in layers of secrecy, Fabrizio Gatti’s “Educazione Americana”, published in 2023 by La Nave di Teseo, emerges as a document of great interest. Based on an extensive interview with an Italian secret agent who worked on delicate CIA clandestine operations, Gatti lucidly unveils the CIA’s underground strategies, transcending European borders to unravel a network of global operations. Since it is not possible to summarize in detail a narrative of a good 400 pages, we have decided to isolate some aspects that seem particularly relevant to understand the modus operandi of the American secret services and some of their allies. Gatti begins with an analysis of the Mossad’s targeted operations, specifically referring to the assassination of engineer Gerald Bull, who was supposed to build Saddam Hussein’s supergun. As we have said, it will be the Israeli secret service that eliminates him with the explicit consent of the American one. This episode opens a gap on the collaborative and sometimes intersecting dynamics between international intelligence agencies. The author highlights the clear distinction between intelligence analysts, who work behind the scenes, and operational agents, described as “ghosts” who act on the front line. The latter, being unofficial, allow an easy denial of responsibility by the United States. The clandestine agents, used for unofficial operations, are described as entities on the margins of the agency, whose existence is known only to their controllers. These figures represent a crucial piece in the mosaic of secret operations. It is even more interesting to confirm that the dirty operations not only existed but are always there, as the world is still a large canvas on which unaware citizens move, and it is the clandestine operational agents who paint new figures and add colors that are often scarlet like blood. One of the most disturbing points of the essay concerns the CIA’s ability to manipulate evidence to safeguard its interests. Gatti highlights how this practice extends to Italian institutions, with the presence of CIA infiltrators. In order to legally protect American intelligence activity in Italy, the agency uses diplomatic covers, especially consular, to mask CIA activities in strategic locations such as Milan and Rome. Regarding the organization chart, real or presumed, of the agency, it is described in Gatti’s essay as a pyramidal organization led by a group of thinkers capable of influencing global events to the advantage of the United States, an aspect that reflects the complexity and influence of the agency. They are able to write history before it manifests itself, so that in allied countries changes occur without harming the interests of the United States. But the agency’s modus operandi is notoriously cynical and unscrupulous, and consequently, the use of torture could not be missing. Gatti’s text confirms that during the hunt for Islamic terrorists, torture was practiced in extra-European countries, naturally allies of the United States and with which there are secret agreements. But it is also confirmed that the kidnapping or seizure of terrorists – see, for example, the case of Abu Omar – is possible due to the tacit collaboration of the services and allied countries, such as Italy, and the presence of military infrastructure such as that of Aviano. It is not surprising that Gatti observes how evidence can be fabricated and how, especially in operations of vital interest to the United States, the CIA is capable of fabricating or eliminating evidence even in Italian institutions. One of the most significant passages is that relating to the broad, pervasive, and capillary influences that the United States, through its security services, have put in place in our country. According to Gatti’s essay, some of the crucial events of contemporary Italian politics, such as those related to Mani Pulite, the fall of the Berlusconi government, and, earlier, Bettino Craxi, were favored and facilitated by the CIA. Of extreme interest is the fact that these destabilization operations in our country substantially confirm what was already happening during the strategy of tension. But it also confirms that there are divergent schools of thought within the CIA, including a current that favored a civil war in Italy. Another disturbing constant that emerges from Gatti’s essay is the traditional opposition between the American and Russian secret services, an opposition that has led to the use of extreme actions such as the physical elimination of the head of the CIA’s secret operations in Italy, just as it happened during the years of the Cold War. This aspect illuminates the ruthless and no-holds-barred nature of international power games. One of the most disconcerting points is the NSA’s ability to monitor Italian communications, both civilian and military. This control, justified by the need to monitor investigations and illicit activities, raises significant concerns about privacy and the integrity of national institutions. Moreover, in the essay of the Italian journalist, the technical possibility is confirmed that the National Security Agency is able to have an exact idea of all the main judicial investigations carried out by the Italian judiciary, especially because these could be very useful to blackmail, influence, or otherwise condition the political choices of our government or part of it. It is precisely in this regard that the hypothesis that the infamous Armed Phalanx was nothing more than a manifestation of state terrorism, born from the collaboration between certain sectors of our services and the Americans, to send precise messages to the Italian political class, finds no contradiction. Similarly, the disturbing link between the agency’s clandestine operations and organized crime is confirmed. After all, Italy is a country where the mafia, corruption, and politics often intertwine, and therefore monitoring a country of this kind means conditioning its choices. In “Educazione Americana,” Fabrizio Gatti not only unveils the obscure and often unmentionable operations of the CIA and other intelligence agencies but also raises fundamental questions about the nature of power, ethics in geopolitics, and the impact of these actions on the world stage. His work opens a window of great importance onto a world normally hidden behind curtains of secrecy, inviting the reader to reflect on the global interconnection of power politics and their ramifications.


11 novembre 2023

State Reason and Political Inequalities

Historically, there have been ideologies that prevent escape from poverty because their aim is to perpetuate poverty and social inequality. Indeed, there are ideologies that benefit from maintaining inequality and poverty, as these form the basis of their consensus. If marginalization and poverty were to disappear, these ideologies would lose their reason for being. When there is abundance, most people live well, and these extremist ideologies remain hidden, like mice waiting for “lean times”. However, they take advantage of crises to emerge, presenting themselves as saviors and change, aiming only for power and personal interests. States often use the dynamics of poverty and social inequality to foment conflicts and revolutions. For example, Lenin used the hardships of the proletariat – the poor, workers, unemployed – as a means to promote significant political changes, often under the banner of class struggle. Consider, for example, the tragic event known as “Bloody Sunday” in 1905 in St. Petersburg as an instance when the oppression and violence of the Tsarist state against its citizens helped create fertile ground for the Russian Revolution. It must be clear that not only the Russian Revolution, but other revolutionary movements have followed a similar model, taking advantage of moments of crisis to advance their objectives. In a broader context, communist revolutions and right-wing extremism are two sides of the same coin in using crisis to mobilize popular support, albeit for opposite ends. In times of economic and social crisis, some political parties may use the issue of immigration and security to gain electoral support, creating a correlation, often used for political purposes, between immigration and security problems. In short, power dynamics can exploit poverty to maintain control, and revolutions often promise change in the name of the poor but can end up perpetuating new cycles of power and oppression. Concretely, states have implemented a real strategy that we might call the “strategy of the poor,” a term that immediately evokes a tactic of exploitation, historically used by states to achieve their ends, often under the guise of noble intentions. This strategy can manifest in different ways, all united by the use of the poor or needy as a tool to achieve further aims, often having little to do with their assistance or improving their living conditions. In a historical context, for example, late 18th-century France used the “strategy of the poor” as a pretext to expand its imperial borders. Napoleon Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign was justified by the need to intervene on behalf of a population oppressed by a corrupt government. However, behind these seemingly altruistic motives were more pragmatic and strategic objectives, like weakening British dominance in India and Egypt. In more recent times, peace missions or humanitarian aid promoted by some states, including again France, must be analyzed critically. Operations in the African continent, for example, do not stem from a desire to stabilize turbulent regions and provide support to local populations but arise from geopolitical and commercial interests, such as the extraction of natural resources and maintaining political influence. The case of South Sudan is emblematic: revelations about the wealth accumulated by local leaders while their country is immersed in a bloody civil war raise disturbing questions about the real beneficiaries of international aid and its actual destination. On the other hand, we must not be deceived about the real intentions of humanitarian aid, which are often just a facade for military interventions and the achievement of political objectives. Examples of this practice have been observed in various parts of the world, from the Balkans to the Middle East, and involve the world’s major powers. Particularly significant are the words of Colin Powell in 2001, who saw NGOs as “force multipliers” for the United States in Afghanistan, revealing a strategic view of humanitarian aid as a tool of foreign policy. In conclusion, the “strategy of the poor” is not just a practice of the past but a current and controversial phenomenon, inviting critical analysis of the true impact of international aid and peace operations on the development and sovereignty of developing countries.


10 novembre 2023

Les possibles causes de l’échec du renseignement israélien

Les analystes israéliens examinent depuis des semaines les raisons du succès de Hamas ou plutôt identifient les raisons pour lesquelles l’intelligence israélienne n’a pas pu réagir rapidement à l’offensive de Hamas le 7 octobre. Les principales raisons de cette absence d’intervention préventive peuvent être résumées comme suit : 1. Sous-évaluation des Capacités du Hamas : L’intelligence israélienne, se basant sur des évaluations erronées, a sous-estimé la capacité opérationnelle du Hamas. Malgré des années d’avertissements concernant leurs exercices militaires à Gaza, l’IMI a estimé que le Hamas n’était pas capable de mener des incursions à grande échelle en Israël. 2. Interprétation Erronée de l’Intelligence : Malgré l’existence de vidéos des exercices militaires du Hamas sur les réseaux sociaux et l’interception de communications entre les commandants du Hamas, l’IMI n’a pas interprété ces signaux comme la préparation d’une attaque majeure. 3. Présomption d’Intentions Pacifistes : L’intelligence israélienne croyait que le Hamas visait un accord avec Israël, malgré les indications contraires provenant des exercices militaires et des communications interceptées. 4. Manque de Préparation pour des Scénarios d’Attaque Massive : Malgré les signaux clairs indiquant une possible attaque à grande échelle, les autorités israéliennes n’ont pas préparé de réponse opérationnelle adéquate, telle que la protection des postes avancés le long de la frontière. 5. Erreur dans l’Évaluation des Intentions du Hamas : Avec le recul, il est évident que l’IMI et le Shin Bet ont gravement mal interprété les intentions du Hamas, malgré les informations disponibles suggérant une préparation pour une attaque surprise. En conclusion, une combinaison de sous-évaluation des capacités du Hamas, d’interprétations erronées de l’intelligence disponible et de présomptions sur les intentions pacifiques du Hamas ont conduit Israël à être pris au dépourvu face à l’offensive du 7 octobre, soulignant un échec majeur dans l’intelligence militaire.


10 novembre 2023

Les leçons cachées du ‘Millennium Challenge 2002

Comme il est bien connu, en 2002, les États-Unis ont mis en place l’exercice militaire appelé “Millennium Challenge 2002” (MC02), la plus grande simulation de guerre de l’histoire, conduite par le United States Joint Forces Command. Avec un budget de 250 millions de dollars et la participation de 13 500 personnes, la simulation avait pour objectif de valider les nouvelles théories de la “transformation militaire”. La simulation a impliqué des forces virtuelles et réelles dans neuf lieux et dix-sept environnements simulés, avec un pays moyen-oriental imaginaire comme adversaire (probablement l’Iran ou l’Irak). Le lieutenant général des Marines Paul K. Van Riper a endossé le rôle de commandant des forces ennemies. Van Riper a exprimé une profonde insatisfaction à l’égard des résultats de l’exercice, affirmant que l’issue avait été manipulée pour garantir la victoire américaine. Il a décrit ces actions dans un courriel de protestation envoyé avant la fin de la simulation, remettant en question l’honnêteté du processus et les implications négatives d’une application pratique de théories non vérifiées. Au cours de la simulation, Van Riper a fait preuve d’ingéniosité en utilisant des méthodes non conventionnelles telles que des motocyclistes pour envoyer des messages, des lumières et des drapeaux pour la communication, et des informations trompeuses pour confondre l’équipe bleue (les forces américaines). Après avoir été isolé technologiquement, il a lancé une attaque massive avec des moyens aériens et navals légers, coulant seize navires ennemis et tuant théoriquement plus de 20 000 ennemis. Cette action a bouleversé les bleus et a démontré la vulnérabilité de leurs forces face à des tactiques asymétriques. En réponse, les organisateurs de l’exercice ont “réinitialisé” le scénario, limitant les options de Van Riper et assurant le succès des bleus. Cela a conduit Van Riper à se retirer de la simulation, et le résultat final a vu une victoire incontestée des bleus. Le rapport de Van Riper post-exercice a été une critique impitoyable de la simulation, exprimant comment la guerre réelle est intrinsèquement imprévisible et chaotique. Le “Millennium Challenge 2002” devient ainsi un avertissement sur le danger de la surinformation et sur l’importance de rester ouvert à des stratégies non conventionnelles et à l’écoute d’opinions différentes. Un excès d’informations, comme démontré, peut paralyser le processus décisionnel et instiller un faux sentiment de sécurité, transformant un avantage apparent en une vulnérabilité critique. De plus : Van Riper, avec son expérience au Vietnam et son adhésion aux principes de Clausewitz, a souligné que la supériorité technologique n’assure pas le succès. Malgré les leçons offertes par l’exercice, les autorités militaires américaines - comme aujourd’hui celles israéliennes - semblent ne pas en tenir compte, continuant à répéter les mêmes erreurs, avec une confiance excessive dans la technologie et un manque d’attention aux critiques et aux stratégies alternatives.


4 maggio 2022

Gagliano Giuseppe la guerra economica costa cara

Limes Maggio 2022 https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/la-guerra-economica-costa-cara-ma-rende

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