18 novembre 2024
Why France Says ‘No’ to a Centralized European Intelligence Service: Insights from Eric Denécé”
“Why France Says ‘No’ to a Centralized European Intelligence Service: Insights from Eric Denécé” Abstract: In a detailed interview, Eric Denécé, a French intelligence expert, explains why France is strongly opposed to the creation of a centralized external intelligence service at the European level. Denécé highlights that a unified agency would undermine national sovereignty and the ability to protect France’s strategic interests. In a context where each European country has different priorities and foreign policies, France fears that sensitive information might be mismanaged or even exploited against its own interests. Through historical examples and strategic considerations, Denécé illustrates how centralization could lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies, slowing down the response to national threats. The interview offers a clear perspective on the challenges and concerns that hinder the idea of a common European intelligence service. Full Translation of the Interview 1. Why does France believe that a centralized European intelligence service could compromise its national sovereignty and internal security? All major European countries oppose the creation of a single external intelligence service. This idea either comes from people who know nothing about intelligence or from smaller countries (particularly the Baltic States) whose size (in terms of area and population) is not even equivalent to an Italian or French region. Frankly, it’s not a serious proposal because foreign intelligence will be the last thing to be pooled if a political Europe is to emerge. As long as there is no European government and no unified European policy to replace those of each member state, there will be no European external intelligence service. This type of service is essentially the arm of each state’s foreign policy and thus serves to defend its interests worldwide. However, not all EU member states share the same international policy, and they are often still in competition, or even rivalry, with each other globally (for market share, political and cultural influence, etc.). For instance, Italy and France, while culturally and historically close, compete for markets in countries like Algeria and Libya. Thus, our interests remain divergent, and so Rome and Paris need their own intelligence services to achieve their international objectives. 2. What concerns does France have about sharing sensitive information with a supranational European intelligence service? I believe that those advocating for a European intelligence service are making a mistake. The EU does not need an external intelligence service. If we were to create something, it would make more sense to start by considering a common security service (like Italy’s AISI or France’s DGSI), which would be easier to establish since most external threats are common to our states (terrorism, subversion, crime, immigration, etc.). Secondly, it would also be easier to design a common military intelligence service, as more and more operations are conducted within a European framework. In the first case, cooperation works well—we already have Europol and Eurojust. In the second case, we have the Situation Center (SITCEN) and the European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejon, Spain. However, we have already faced significant difficulties in getting Italian, French, and German military intelligence services to collaborate in providing images to the EUSC, which often ends up purchasing the images it needs from private European, American, and Japanese providers. 3. How do legal and cultural differences between national intelligence systems in Europe pose challenges to the effectiveness of a centralized service, according to French experts? I believe this is a non-issue. If a European service is ever created, it will have its own culture and legal rules, which will not be those of any individual state but those defined by the political authority it serves. As a result, operators from different EU countries could participate, and this service would be a new “melting pot.” But again, I remind you that as long as there is no European government and no unified European policy to replace those of individual member states, there will be no European external intelligence service. 4. What cybersecurity and infiltration risks does France perceive in the creation of a unified European intelligence agency? It’s not cybersecurity and infiltration risks that concern France regarding a hypothetical common intelligence service: it’s the loss of sovereignty on one hand and the fear that its international interests will no longer be defended on the other. For instance, twenty years ago, an agreement was reached between France (DGSE) and Germany (BND) on monitoring international risks. The DGSE monitored terrorist threats from North Africa, while the BND focused on Eastern Europe and Russia. Both countries were supposed to share the information they gathered. The outcome was inconclusive because the Germans did not see the threat from North Africa as a concern, and the French significantly reduced their collection resources in Eastern Europe, relying on the Germans, even though that area also affects our security. We thus found ourselves partially blindsided during the events of 2014. 5. How could centralizing intelligence services reduce France’s ability to respond quickly to threats specific to its territory? Simply because European political leaders might consider that threats to France’s territorial integrity, its interests, or its citizens are not a priority and might instead focus their attention on other issues. Today, we can see that Poland, the Baltic States, and Germany are much more focused on the Russian threat than on the threats posed by immigration or terrorism, which are far more dangerous for Italy and France. 6. Do French experts believe that creating a single European intelligence service could lead to excessive bureaucracy? If so, how would it impact operational efficiency? Absolutely! We have two clear examples of what could happen. On the one hand, the European Commission itself (and the Parliament as well), a bureaucratic and technocratic monster characterized by genuine wastefulness. On the other hand, the CIA: this agency underwent a significant personnel increase after September 11, 2001, and has become a bureaucratic administration marked by intense internal rivalries and resource waste. 7. How can France ensure that its strategic interests and defense policy are not compromised by a centralized intelligence service at the EU level? Quite simply: by maintaining an external intelligence service that serves its own interests and is responsible for defending its own strategic priorities worldwide. 8. What historical examples show that France has been reluctant to share sensitive information with other European countries, and how does this affect its current position? When it comes to defending their interests, states rarely share information with one another. Most of the time, there is no need to. For instance, when Greenpeace threatened French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, we had no reason to share that information with anyone. The situation is different when threats are shared (such as during the Cold War or in facing Islamic terrorism). But even then, sharing information or analyses does not lead to shared perspectives. A good example is the 2011 “Libyan revolution,” when France and the UK, with US support, intervened under the pretext that “Gaddafi was about to commit a bloodbath,” creating the chaos we now know. At that time, Italian intelligence, which has had a deep understanding of the region since 1935, had a different perspective and was proven right. Sharing information does not mean that it will be taken into account. Once again, it is politics that decides!
