



Giuseppe Gagliano

Intelligence Dictionary



CESTUDEC

Introduction

In this dictionary, we have tried to analyze secret service modus operandi (which historically spans both the Cold War period and present times) in terms of political realism, revealing a reality that is both complex and cynical, given that it is inspired by reasons of state. A multi-colored picture has come to life in which reality and illusion, truth and lie often merge until overlapping.

Dictionary

ACCURATE CONTROL In authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, the control exercised by intelligence can reach such high levels that civil society collapses (such as by the Gestapo, the Stasi, and Sovama).

ALLIANCES The joining of forces and SIGINT and HUMINT intelligence agencies in the same country or allied nations against supranational enemies (e. g. the UK-USA Agreements and the CAZAB Convention) can provide a remarkable contribution to the struggle, without, however forgetting – as SVR agent KO-BALADZE once said “there are allied countries, but there are no allied secret services”.

AMBIGUITY The boundary between legality and illegality is faint, even in a country's peacetime defense strategy.

ANTHROPOLOGY Anyone who has worked in security services for a long time can only have a pessimistic view of human beings because he or she has been forced "to see its other side", and therefore disillusionment is inevitable. Cannot an impressive number of impostors also be found in politics, for example? This should come as no surprise, since power is an authentic means of corruption and which politician has no skeleton in the closet?

ANTICIPATING Constant investigation of the staff is a good way to avoid economic and sexual blackmail involving analysts and agents.

APPARENT PARADOX A high degree of

technological adulteration can be an element of vulnerability, especially nowadays.

APPEARANCES Contrary to an amateur's conception of the role of intelligence, open sources are more effective instruments than concealed sources, as long as they can be easily understood.

APPOINTMENTS If the appointment of a director in so-called democratic countries is the result of frequently murky political compromises, the influence of external decision-makers can exert equally significant clout (think of US influence on the appointment of Italian intelligence directors in the period from the end of World War II to the Cold War).

ARCHIVES As is widely known, an intelligence service's memory support lies in its

archives. Archive conservation can often make the difference between a fast and effective decision-making process and a slow, jumbled process without any realistic process incidence.

BALANCING In order to avoid an imbalance of power in the army's favor, the Executive often establishes civil intelligence structures that overlap other structures, absorb their resources, and compromise investigative effectiveness. The combination of special forces and skillful intelligence analysts can be the key to success for covert operations in very unstable areas such as Africa and the Middle East.

BASIC RULES Counter-intelligence operations require a few basic rules: 1) penetrating enemy organizations and double-dealing are necessary; 2) constantly keep both

one's enemy and ally on alert; 3) control national territory constantly and accurately; 4) make a realistic analysis of the enemy; 5) collaborate intensely with both foreign intelligence and military secret services.

BEING CONTEMPORARY Analyzing present information and predictions accurately are tasks that must be carried out in parallel.

BETRAYALS Organizing intelligence structures into watertight compartments is a good way to at least limit the loss of agents and contain the devastating consequences caused by defection.

BETRAYERS The validity of a service also depends on its ability to identify and kill betrayers.

BIAS It is hard to deny the existence of serious prejudice against intelligence services by the politicized judiciary.

BORDERS Intelligence procedures clearly often imply violations of morality and the law, and therefore we need not be surprised: going beyond borders is one of the main reasons for the creation of intelligence operations. In this light, it is not surprising when security services hire violent persons, killers and convicted felons. It is also obvious that if the risk of blackmail arises, their death becomes necessary. Using professional killers is not always the best choice, and it might be more appropriate to use experts willing to carry out extreme and delicate operations for reasons of state.

BOUNDARIES AND NEUTRALITY Like

neutral nations, marginal cities always provide useful geopolitical contexts for secret services.

BUDGETS(1) The substantial funding often provided to the intelligence bureau is not always a prerequisite to effectiveness.

BUDGETS(2) Whenever intelligence service budgets increase significantly in a short time, it is frequently due to corruption and not work-related. This corruption will end up devastating the credibility and the effectiveness of the security services.

CAMOUFLAGE Killing the enemy is inevitable in insecure political contexts, and we need not be surprised by sophisticated strategies like those adopted by the Bulgarian secret services, the KGB, or

the Mossad (see the Paulkin's make of a bomb hidden in a chocolate box).

CAUTION We should not be surprised whenever an intelligence service director of sector manager adopts an ambiguous and moderate attitude towards politics.

CENTRALIZATION In order to keep an intelligence service trustful, it is desirable to let just one attorney's office have access to confidential documents, especially in countries where the perception of national interest is weak.

CENTRALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Great personalities in intelligence can usually work on different fronts while centralizing all the informative sectors at the same time, especially when the trust of the Executive is uncon-

ditional (see Prouteau's role in the GIGN between 1973 and 1982).

CHARISMA Great personalities manage to radically reorganize a security service structure, leaving a decisive mark.

COLLABORATION In case of emergency, intelligence services can work in close collaboration with all the social organizations active in a territory (see the close collaboration between Pecchioli and General Dalla Chiesa when he was the chief of the Antiterrorism Special Unit).

COMPENSATION In order to hinder subversive dangers, intelligence structures need to ally with subversive organizations that are no less dangerous but considered instead more trustful in the specific historical context.

COMPUTERIZATION Excessive emphasis on the decisive role of computer technology brought intelligence to over-value the security guaranteed by paper archives and underestimate the permeability of computer barriers. We still cannot be sure about the investigations of staff (civil or military), which is still a possibility that must be considered.

CONCEALING The creation of a fake psychological profile is necessary to consolidate the professional competence of both operative agent and every service director. The more sophisticated the elaboration of one's fake personality is, the greater is the success achieved.

CONFLICTS(1) A typical conflict within secret services is certainly the one between intelligence and counter-intelligence.

In this regard, we recall the conflicts between the CIA and FBI, and between the STASI and HVA.

CONFLICTS(2) Conflicts occur due to the difference between intelligence agents and analysts: in most cases, the lack of coordination is so evident that the work of the agents work is intentionally unrelated to the work of the analysts.

CONTRIBUTIONS(1) Contributions from the private sector to the growth of intelligence services has always been and remains essential.

CONTRIBUTIONS(2) The stability to which security services contributed – e.g. during the Cold War – allowed the Executive to predict the enemy's moves with certainty.

COOPERATION(1) Cooperation and teamwork are essential in carrying out effective operations and avoiding the overlapping of intelligence services.

COOPERATION(2) Due to work-related reasons, intelligence services must sign transitional or permanent alliances with terrorist and criminal groups even based on blackmail. As a matter of fact, the recruitment of triple-crossing free-lance traffickers is not an exception (especially during a war). The instrumentalization of terrorist action by intelligence services is more common than one would imagine.

COVER Journalistic activity not only lends itself to manipulation in favor of intelligence services, but can also provide the good cover required for carrying out successful intelligence operations.

COVERING This traditional strategy used by intelligence to cover its information activities or counter-intelligence operations is the foundation of cultural institutions.

COWARDICE The pusillanimity of the political class often emerges in the worst possible way, such as when competent operative agents or analysts run up against judicial errors and the political class typically denies them assistance (e.g. the dramatic case of Colonel Giovannone).

CRIMINALS An intelligence bureau with high ambitions often requires the recruitment of people with no sense of morality. We should not be surprised if blackmail is a common procedure in intelligence operations.

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY Adequate security service must avail of a wide variety of experts from different fields: from the science to economics, and for this reason, recruitment must be carried out in highly-qualified contexts.

CROSS-PARTY AGREEMENTS When terroristic destabilization reaches peaks of high danger, informal agreements must be signed with secret services considered alien or even hostile to national security. This is “lesser evil” politics used in cases of extreme danger.

CUTTING BACK THE COSTS An efficient intelligence service must oblige its decision-maker to cut the costs of a potential conflict (conventional or not) and identify the enemy's intentions, potentialities, and limits.

DEFINITIONS One of the best definitions of espionage undoubtedly defines it as a never-ending war due to the extreme mobility of the targets.

DEMARCATIION Every service should be able to distinguish between conventional or merging threats, especially considering that the current threat is asymmetric and not linear. It has become extremely important, in fact, to quickly comprehend the dangers from cyberspace threats.

DESERT OF MIRRORS As Angleton used to say, intelligences services are often faced with false deserters and true lies, and this create deserts of dazzling, confusing mirrors.

DETAILS Just as in the detective field, observing details can definitely make the

difference in analysis and prediction in the intelligence field as well.

DISAGREEMENT Unanimous opinion on the importance of analysts and operative agents does not exist, especially when considering how wide and significant open sources are.

DISCONTENT Careful study into the reasons behind discontent and dissent in civil society is undoubtedly one of an intelligence service's tasks. Even the most exhaustive analysis cannot always anticipate the creation of revolutionary organizations in civil society, however.

DISCRETIONALITY Without a doubt, the Intelligence service director needs national authorization to deal with security and consequently has the right to set sta-

te secrets. Similarly, granting or denying permission is also part of the director's tasks.

DISPARITY The disparity of means and personnel between national services is clearly evident, and either increases or decreases depending on political circumstances and historical context.

DOMESTIC CONFLICT Concerning relations between services of the same country, it is a fact that a constant conflict exists between domestic defense services and external defense services in most European or extra-European nations. This rivalry and conflict determines a waste of energy and time, taking players away from their targets.

DOMESTIC DESTABILIZATION Destabilization conducted to damage the Exe-

cutive of one's own country can be used together with traditional external destabilization.

DOSSIERS The production of dossiers on the private lives of "distinguished men" has not historically represented a departure from intelligence service conduct but rather a cautionary measure. Even the existence of a substantial amount of this sort of document does not represent an estrangement from the tasks of a security service.

DOUBLE LOYALTY Regional services have often been forced to perform a double loyalty towards their country, especially during the 20th century, when the governing class of the regional intelligence service was untrustworthy and even conniving with enemy intelligence.

EFFECTIVENESS In order to gain maximum advantage from intelligence service, the Executive must use information properly without ideological prejudices or personal idiosyncrasies.

EFFICIENCY The first requisite that makes intelligence operations efficient is certainly periodical meetings among colleagues from other countries' secret services. These meetings are aimed at organizing common strategies against mutual enemies. True collaboration among services does not require any kind of subordination. The second condition for efficiency regards the means to be employed, which need to be considerable and unrestricted. The General Director needs storm troops, special funds and false documents at his disposal. The third condition concerns the General

Director's permanence, which if too short will only cause confusion. The fourth condition regards the composition of the team, which can only be mixed since it is made of civilian and military officers. The fifth requisite is the presence of so-called informers, who can belong to any social class. They need to be well paid in order for their work to be totally efficient.

ESSENTIAL INFORMATION In times of war, information on troop deployment, code books, railway and road junctions, and industrial and military equipment is fundamentally important.

EVALUATION The evaluation of elements provided by intelligence poses an important problem for both democratic and totalitarian regimes. Whenever governments judge intelligence asses-

gments irrelevant, actions will be nullified.

EXCESS The two mistakes made most frequently by analysts are over-generalization and its opposite.

EXECUTIVE The most desirable Executive for an Intelligence service director is certainly one who consents to the demands and respects the professionalism of the latter.

EXPLOITING Exploiting the legitimate demands of a people to destabilize one's enemy is surely one of the most perceptive but also more dangerous strategies. These stratagems can easily backfire.

FACTS Any professional must be able to discern essential facts from unessential facts; wide and deep knowledge of poli-

tical dynamics is decisive in carrying out effective processes.

FAILURES Obviously these re-organizations may be partly failures because they leave basic problems unsolved. When dealing with remarkable failures, the Executive can control the services by removing members considered incompetent and, as a result, it can carry out plans to reorganize and institute specialized boards to spot and correct possible inadequacies.

FALSE NEWS DIVULGATION Not infrequently, security services can help by spreading false news or partially true information in order to provide intimidating messages to enemies or rivals. The Executive often uses a part of the most reliable intelligence to complete misinformation operations and damage political

rivals or competitors belonging to the same party.

FICTION J.F. Dulles' definition of an intelligence bureau is probably the best because it is realistically cynical, and states that an intelligence service is nothing but power's underground arm, a multi-purpose weapon, an instrument of subversion, manipulation and violence that secretly interferes in other countries' internal affairs in order to destabilize them while consolidating and expanding the power of its own country.

GAP However sophisticated analysis instruments may be, neglect by the political class or the scarce importance given to such intelligence by the political class can render even the most exhaustive analysis useless.

GENESIS It is difficult to deny that the rise of intelligence services is strictly linked to the development of warfare.

GREY ZONE The subversive turmoil that emerges in a society can be either suppressed or fueled as required by the specific logic of power, which can even cut across political parties beneath the common political top.

HIERARCHIES We should remember that crucial decisions must be taken by the Executive, while the service is required to organize the action plans. It goes without saying that the information required to carry out efficient national or foreign policies must be provided by intelligence services (and especially illegal services).

HISTORICAL CONTEXT The influence of the historical context is a vital aspect in the identification of intelligence priorities and aims (the historical context determines different ideological currents even in intelligence schools).

HISTORICITY Intelligence priorities are highly conditioned by the historical context, as are also the counter-measures chosen.

HYPOCRISY Supposing the vision of the nation held by intelligence to be reconcilable with a democratic vision is a gross mistake (and often caused by bad faith), as is believing that a democratic system does not use services to misinform and manipulate public opinion. The third mistake is the illusion of controlling secret services operations on the whole through

Parliamentary committees ad hoc.

HUMAN RIGHTS Especially in Latin American countries, human rights associations can be a serious obstacle for intelligence activities. The borderline between legal and illegal activity is quickly and completely crossed.

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS Top security tasks can only be assigned to those who demonstrate complete loyalty to institutions.

ILLEGAL OPERATIONS The execution of illegal operations often requires the constitution of special independent sectors unrelated to traditional control centers. The more confidential they are, the more protected they will be against possible infiltration. One of their aims is certainly murder.

IMPONDERABLE FACTORS In wartime, intelligence is not always able to estimate the enemy army's exact time and speed of reaction to offensives. Being aware of this factor is good sense.

IMPROVING Making consulates and embassies more effective from an informative point of view would save money on often useless technological renewals. Field observation and direct knowledge of the vital points of the foreign country subjected to intelligence analysis are still essential instruments.

INCREASES As for financial resources, a higher number of officers does not guarantee success. On the contrary, higher numbers can bring paralysis or disorder. The quality of the human resources is always the decisive element.

INCREASING IMPORTANCE Given the essential importance of economical factors, divisions specialized in financial counter-intelligence should be created. In this sense, the Japanese JETRO analysts understood the fundamental importance of obtaining crucial economical information from OSINT sources.

INDIVIDUALISM Efficient coordination within the intelligence services must exclude extreme individualism, even if rare individuals have proven capable of working better than worn out administrative machines.

INEVITABLE INCOMPLETENESS In order to avoid unverifiable and unrealistic predictions, every reliable professional must accept that information can never be completely exhaustive.

INFILTRATION(1) Detecting and reporting enemy infiltration in very important civil or military institutions is one of the main tasks of Intelligence service, even if many political circumstances can delay or hinder the counter-measures required. The decisive factor is surely the political orientation.

INFILTRATION (2) Infiltration should be promoted not only in a subversive context but also in an institutional context, and cannot be carried out by both the intelligence defensive sector and its offensive sector, both the national apparatus and the foreign apparatus in alternation, also because this leads to intelligence service overlapping. Such overlapping can also occur in a traditional power apparatus such as political parties and labor unions. Infiltration can be carried out

by “territorial sources”, in other words, sources located near the apparatus to be penetrated.

INFORMATION(1) We should never forget that services are like a huge riddle where thousands, even hundreds of thousands of items (of information) are collected, after which the substance is gained and only the most important items will be carried out in Executive politics. Information is a heterogeneous and polychrome whole, and as such splits incessantly. Information evolution is, in fact, a non-stop process, and because the General Director often has to work without knowing the precise and clear aim, information needs to be trustful for use as a prelude to victory. Information basically needs to be precise, and for this reason, technical skill is fundamentally important

in an intelligence service.

INFORMATION(2) The importance of information for intelligence agencies is proven by the fact that it has often changed political procedures and strategic choices. It is not by chance that most existing secret services take consider the so-called informative cycle and its accurate phases carried out by each service (e.g. the phases suggested by Kent in the ONE in the CIA). Of course, there are always difficulties in obtaining information caused by the international setting, the political contest, the poor functionality of the service or analysts with inadequate backgrounds, for example. Generally speaking, the main types of information are military, strategic, scientific, economical, and political information.

INFORMERS The existence of a wide and capillary network of informers in the most various fields of civil society enables intelligence to perform its activities with enhanced effectiveness. Needless to say, especially in authoritarian and totalitarian political systems, the widespread control and elimination of dissent occur with great rapidity. Furthermore, exiles, emigrates, and criminal organizations are among the most commonly-used sources and usually make substantial contributions to improving the quality of information and anticipating events.

INSIDE ENEMIES The intelligence Director must aware of both external enemies and the political conflicts caused by attorney's offices, mass media, and other enemies in the same country who might be interested in destroying intelligence.

INSTRUMENTS Among operative procedures, both regime change and economical sabotage are commonly adopted *modus operandi* for all intelligence services that act at international level.

The instruments used by security services doubtlessly include illegal financing of allied governments, especially their parties and trade unions, with the aim of causing either political consolidation or destabilization. Another widely used technique is the creation of illegal apparatus that work as spy networks, which at the right time can be used as infrastructures for insurrectionary movements. The use of technology – COMINT, for example – is now an essential instrument in invading the enemy's field and expanding illegal operations, at least as interference inside movements or associations deemed hostile or liable to create effective

exploitation. One more element used for consolidation is paramilitary activities, which are carried out not only through the organization of regime change but also through infiltration and escape.

INSTRUMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR One of the most sophisticated instruments for mind and information manipulation has been and still remains the cinema. See the important role of OWI in the USA.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WEAKNESSES Many factors can pose a real threat to security service. Political intrusion is certainly one of them, along with the nomination of ingenuous personalities, limited terms given to the Executive, and the lack of selective recruitment.

INTERCHANGE Intelligence work frequently requires the alternation of cynical and daring practices with scrupulous, cautious operations.

INTERPRETATION Information must be interpreted in order to provide a complete picture with meaning that helps plan an efficient action.

JOURNALISTS By now all the intelligence agencies should have realized that the press and mass media in general pose potentially devastating threat to intelligence operations. Seeking the trust of the print media and infiltrating agents should have become routine activities by now.

KEEN RIVALRY Rivalry among informative agencies – which is often harsh and

counter-productive – is demonstrated by the centrality of their methods: some are more concerned with the SIGINT, others with the HUMINT dimension. This shows how damaging unilateralism can be to national security on one hand, and how unilateralism can give advantage to any potential enemy on the other.

LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES The arrogance and superficiality of the governing class often pose insuperable obstacles to practical collaboration with intelligence services.

LESSONS Regardless of the outcome of a conflict – conventional or not – related studies can be very useful for intelligence purposes.

LIMITED FAILURES Whenever a spy

organization has a considerable amount of money, a high number of operative agents and analysts, and wide discretionary power such to be able to afford serious loss, failures can only be contained.

LIMITS The most recurrent limits on intelligence activity are the existence of heterogeneous organizations, the sectorial nature of the work that leads to fragmentation or the implementation of operative independence that compromises attempts at coordination, and finally, the absence of a common planning activity. The greatest divisions occur however when the ideological and/or character incompatibility among different fields of the same service is strong enough to hamstrings effective activity.

LONELINESS It should be obvious that

working as a spy is a solitary job because the ways of thinking and procedures of operative agents and of analysts are far from everyday reality.

LONG TERM Highly-professional intelligence service activities require wider ambitions, without which they are likely to regress to a poor informative activity with limited effectiveness.

MASS MEDIA The mass media certainly hinder intelligence operations too often, and for such reason they have to be fenced away from important sources. Mass media sabotage against professional informers is devastating to the outcome of intelligence operations. In any case, it is wise to be on good terms with all those journalists previously assessed as reliable.

MATHEMATICAL SYSTEM The creation of sophisticated mathematical systems, such as Zadeh's fuzzy logic, can undoubtedly contribute to improving analyses and previsions as more sophisticated processes like AHP or ANP do.

MEANS When intelligence works abroad, it participates in regime changes very often. Without a doubt, special forces must play fundamental roles in these cases. There is no need to specify that this kind of action must be carried out by the Executive, because it is clear that these activities need to be localized and require precision by all the players. These kinds of actions obviously require high precision and decision-making capacity.

MEDIATION CENTERS The foundation of mediation centers among secret servi-

ces can be useful in solving serious conflicts of interests at delicate moments on the international scene.

MEMORY Any secret service – and any counter-intelligence service all the more so – cannot leave its historic memory latent.

MILITARY HEGEMONY In the civil intelligence field related to domestic affairs, hegemony over the top levels has often been held by the army, which is characteristically mistrustful of civil agents.

MONEY LAUNDERING It is not uncommon for intelligence agencies to create fake banks in order to launder dirty capital.

MOSAIC In times of war, one of the main

aims of counter-intelligence can be ethnic destabilization. The more complicated the ethnic context is, the more effective the outburst will be.

MUTUAL CONTROL It is an illusion to consider intelligence activities as operations conducted only against opponents or enemies: control can also be fostered among the same services of the same country or embassy officials often kept in the dark, especially of illegal operations. Rarely is the opposite true.

NEGOTIATIONS During and after armistices, intelligence plays a decisive role in both learning the enemy's intentions and the exact composition of his forces.

NERVE CENTERS The profound renewal of an intelligence service usually entails the adjustment of the central divi-

sions, which are the nerve centers of any service.

NEW REQUIREMENTS Expanding the informative context by including important areas of civil society might be a big step forward in preventing new asymmetric threats (e.g. the MOSSAD – named TSOMER – turned out to be very important because exiled Jews took part, or the SLEEPERS in the STASI).

NEWS FRAGMENTATION Fragmenting news to make the comprehension of the whole impossible is desirable in limiting the risk posed by the spread of information or its leakage. Some sort of watertight compartmentalization must be applied to information.

NON-INSTITUTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Along with security services, informal intelligence agencies have always existed, such as cultural, religious, and political-cultural associations, for example. These organizations not only influence public opinion, they can also control the territory accurately. The importance of these organizations increases according to their number of associates and their geographical extension.

NORMAL ADMINISTRATION Organizing anti-insurrectionist campaigns in extremely unstable countries is normal administration even for medium-sized services.

OFFSHOTS The more widespread a network of counterintelligence agents is, the better. When necessary, it is often useful to organize parallel networks as wa-

tertight compartments, especially when difficult and long-term operations are envisioned.

ORGANIZATIONS Together with Historic Offices and the Cable Secretariat, the management of illegal services often constitutes the most important intelligence apparatus, at least within the most important agencies. Most illegal service agents work abroad in undercover operations and conduct the most different tasks in the most diverse fields. Illegal services are obviously composed of several divisions divided into geographical or thematic area. Within this field, the existence of espionage and counter-intelligence departments, in addition to covert operations (so-called CIA covert actions), complements all these illegal activities considerably. Scientific and technological

activity is another aspect to be taken into consideration. It must be noted that the more complex and well-organized the internal structure of a service is, the more difficult the achievement of rapid execution will be, and the easier it will be to infiltrate the core of such service. In light of these considerations, it should not be surprising to see how difficult it is to coordinate the intelligence community, which is jealous of its own autonomy.

OVERLAPPING For the most part, the proliferation of mixed or omni-dimensional intelligence agencies (exclusively military or not) considerably harms national security by needlessly duplicating effort and causing great loss of money. The impossibility to distinguish between regionally and internationally significant information further complicates the pro-

blem. It is unnecessary to dwell too long on the conflicts between intelligence agencies of the same country, rivalries which the opponent's counter-intelligence will certainly take advantage of. Although the unification of military intelligence – by now carried out in several countries – is an important step in overcoming the tribalism typical of the intelligence community, it is certainly not the final solution. Moreover, it is no surprise to see that coordination among different services is insufficient or nonexistent. Even in counter-intelligence operations, mutual interference is quite common.

PACIFISM Especially in the case of psychological war, using pacifism for intelligence purposes can certainly be useful. See the “Generals for Peace” movement, which was founded in 1981 under the auspices of Moscow and of the HVA, for example.

PARALLEL ARCHIVES Beyond official archives – both paper-based archives and computer files – intelligence apparatus establish ad hoc staff that organize unofficial archives where files not related to the official institutional purposes can be found.

PARALLEL SERVICES For security reasons, the Executive not infrequently enacts directives regarding the constitution of secret services. These directives are not announced either by the Parliament or by the official Intelligence community.

PARALYSIS The paralysis of an intelligence apparatus can often be caused by planned floods of deserters who give contradictory information.

PARTIALITY Whenever intelligence operations are affected by evident partiality, na-

tional interest will certainly be harmed.

PHANTOMS The creation of ad hoc press agencies or magazines is a typical measure adopted for the purpose of carrying out successful psychological warfare. It is thus fully within the institutional goals of a security service.

PLANNING Especially in wartime, excluding the intelligence services from operative planning is a gross mistake that can only lead to tragic consequences for national security.

PLANNING When a security service's expenses grow too high, an analytic planning of the estimated expenses must be performed.

PLANS OF EMERGENCY The establishment of elite troops capable of waging

non-conventional war is essential whenever the geopolitical context presents risks of high instability. Intelligence service must obviously protect them and set a state secret.

POISON The use of toxic substances to kill enemies or betrayers is surely one of the oldest and most effective techniques. By no accident, toxicology is now a scientific discipline and a part of scientific intelligence divisions.

POLITICAL HIERARCHIES In political hierarchies, a relationship of trust must be established between the service General Director and the Executive, otherwise strategy fails. The Executive must choose the aim of the intelligence activity; the General Director must manage the rest of the means.

POWER STRUGGLE When power struggles between intelligence services in the same country or in with the same security service become common knowledge, the security apparatus loses credibility. Above and beyond, there is also a bitter struggle among the different branches of the army aimed at each one's own respective candidate. This struggle is linked to the wise use of misinformation implemented with the complicity of the press.

PREDICTION One of the priorities of intelligence is to provide decision-makers with precise predictions so that they can quickly decide and organize efficient defensive or offensive action. Another fundamental priority related to prediction is distinguishing two essential variables: time and space. Close collaboration

between decision-makers and planners is essential in making efficient predictions.

PREDICTIONS Above and beyond the differences among services, spreading preemptive information is surely an unavoidable aim. For as much as the informative dimension is overriding, it should not be excluded that intelligence activity might take political paths in order to allow political action to expand as effectively as possible.

PREJUDICE Adapting facts to suit one's own prejudices or interests –which are not always clear – is a common mistake, and one that is even made by those with the longest seniority as well.

PREVENTION If the main goal of intelli-

gence services is to anticipate threats, it is obvious that the lack of facilities with warning skills is a serious shortcoming.

PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC DESTABILIZATION To prevent widespread dissent in a country that poses a danger to national security, political filings, infiltration and misinformation can be very useful tools.

PROGRESS The identification of scientific and technological information can be decisive in quick victory or defeat.

PROPAGANDA As shown by the history of security services, it is by now certain that the manipulation of public opinion is a valid instrument in harming the enemy. In this sense, traditional tools include balloons containing advertising material

(e.g. the CIA used this tool in the 1960's against China). Propaganda is extremely useful against totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Financing publishers and magazines is also valid propaganda activity and traditionally divided into white, gray and black propaganda; the creation of radios is very common as well. Sending agents to countries considered hostile in order to encourage dissidents by organizing disorder and stirring up discontent is another part of misinformation procedures. Promoting the publishing of literature – specialized or not – with the aim of propaganda and information against one or more opponents is one of the tools most widely used by security services worldwide.

PROPORTIONALITY It should be obvious that intelligence analysis chan-

ges in proportion to the risk.

QUALITY Identifying the most important of many items of information can only be done by highly-qualified personnel who can distinguish between confirmed, probable, plausible, controversial, improbable, and unverifiable information.

QUESTIONS A purely realistic approach can help secret services anticipate not only events but also questions.

RECRUITMENT The use of prisoners of war as informers or infiltrators can be very useful, especially in times of war.

RELATIONS Relations between services and a considerable number of private institutions are a fundamental element to carry out covert intelligence actions.

In particular, the support given to many foundations, associations, newspapers and publishers is an essential in consolidating or expanding psychological war.

SABOTAGE One of the tasks of the illegal activity is to sabotage civil and military facilities. Security services have made a decisive contribution in transforming the art of sabotage into a scientific discipline.

SCARCE IMPORTANCE Intelligence services can be relevant and effectively carry out their tasks only in countries where national interest has great importance.

SELECTED ELIMINATION The creation of departments for the elimination of enemies and betrayers through advanced techniques is a binding necessity, espe-

cially in non-democratic regimes. This kind of illegal operation cannot be recognized by the State, of course.

SELLING Selling important information to the highest bidder is common practice in the Intelligence world

SERVICE RENEWAL It is often necessary to renew a security service from its base in order to keep it efficient. When this kind of operation is carried out, stratifications that hinder renewal are inevitable. Shady operators work inside services, in fact, and live off them to promote their shady deals. In order to eliminate these obstacles, the General Director needs the permission of the Executive to dismiss all the inefficient and corrupted members who obstruct common intelligence activities. A similar operation must

also be performed towards the parallel networks that arise inside services in order to take advantage of them.

SHARING Once mutual differences have been overcome, a nation's intelligence agencies should be able to upload all the information regarding the most critical areas in order to ensure complete information all across the board, in this way also avoiding duplication (an important example can be found in Negroponte, 2006).

SOLICITING Prostitutes, trade fairs, the scientific industry, and intellectual circles (university professors, journalists, experts, etc.) are the most common players in co-opting or infiltration activities. Sexuality has been – and still is – common blackmail that must be calibrated to

the client being manipulated.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS Without a doubt, most of these activities are conducted by paramilitary operations or through the creation of armed forces. The composition of this apparatus is the result of mixtures of professional agents from special forces and mercenary troops. Historically – and at present – the use of paramilitary procedures in illegal operations comes from the OSS and the SOE. It should therefore come as no surprising when special operations procedures violate the current moral code: in a word, moral restrictions hinder the achievement of the goals adopted in the name of national security and reasons of state.

SPECIFIC GROUPS The constitution of informal intelligence groups born in unu-

sual contexts is necessary, especially whenever regional or international instabilities are particularly serious (see the Brosio group born in 1968 in the USA).

SPEED If agencies do not send information quickly, the chance to anticipate the events is lost. Technological facilities – from radar to satellite devices – anticipate events with considerable advance. On a theoretical level, the progress made by cryptanalysis and cartography has surely helped make often decisive predictions.

STAGNATION Anyone who wants to consistently renovate such a delicate structure as an intelligence service will only encounter difficulties caused by “power sedimentation”. Ostracism and normalization are also frequent.

SUBORDINATION A hierarchy emer-

ges between politics and intelligence organizations that often give the upper echelons in the intelligence service a temporary character, especially when the incompetence of the leadership works together with pressure from public opinion to harm the security service organization.

SUPPORT In many cases, supporting terrorists and dictatorships has been and remains necessary (see the destabilization wrought by the USA in Mossadegh's Iran, Guzman's Guatemala, Allende's Chile, Somoza's Nicaragua or the support – by training or financing – given by the HVA to the PLO, Cuba, Zanzibar, Yemen, and Sudan). Psychophysical torture, kidnapping, the use of mercenaries (see Steiner) or terrorists (like the famous Carlos, for example) have followed in train. These kinds of support often

require the cooperation of different departments that may or may not belong to the same intelligence service or the same country but are usually administratively and politically independent. As a result, overlapping and consequent conflicts are no exception in intelligence world.

SUPPORTERS Even a secret service with extensive power cannot work completely alone and requires well-structured network of satellite services.

TECHNIQUES When dealing with huge amounts of information, knowing how to gather and understand data can make the difference between success and failure.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION The requirements for maintaining the compe-

titiveness of a service include the increase of technological innovation and the respective specialized training due to the greater importance of SIGINT.

TECHNOLOGY Despite the excellent quality of technological equipment supported by contemporary intelligence, technology cannot substitute human intelligence, and aims and choices must always be made by men. The human factor is an unavoidable element in evaluating whether an intelligence bureau is efficient or not.

TENSION One aim of intelligence is to promote institutions that maintain instability in terms of misinformation and operations that legitimize the re-establishment of institutional legality.

TIES In times of war, close collaboration

between secret services and general staff during planning should be essential.

TOTALITARIANISM AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE In a totalitarian context, intelligence operations can often be very efficient and more amoral than in democratic context. Intelligence procedures can be carried out to full effectiveness without moral or judicial commitments.

TRUE NATURE Historically, security services do not have their own defined ideology, nor do they claim incontrovertible truth about strategies. Both ideological choices and strategy must change with historical circumstances, and precisely for this reason, the saying “*veritas filia temporis*” must be accepted by every agent and analyst.

TURNOVER Frequent turnover, both in

sectors and in the headquarters, only deeply damage intelligence activities.

TYPES(1) In order to avoid misunderstanding, the different types of intelligence must be considered: 1) information services that aim only at spotting and evaluating information, 2) informative secret services that must collect information through non-conventional techniques, 3) secret services that engage in misinformation, the subversion of enemy institutions even through psychological warfare or covert institutions (e.g. the Cuban ICAP), the promotion of terrorism to delegitimize the enemy or weakening him by wearing him down from the inside, and illegal operations through paramilitary groups or special forces – such as TF-121 or the Russian SPETSNAZ, in order to eliminate opponents; 4) security services that protect prominent personalities from possi-

ble assassination attempts.

TYPES (2) Two types of intelligence services can be discerned in the twentieth century: global (such as the CIA or KGB) and regional (such as SISMI). This division obviously depends on the overall purposes, the geographical areas taken into account, and on the wealth (the criterion known as cost-effectiveness is, without a doubt, one of the best in estimating how effective intelligence operations are). Another criterion places emphasis on the purposes of the service, which can be either defensive or offensive.

Finally, the distinctions between peacetime and wartime intelligence and between services that work within a democracy and those operating in a totalitarian regime are extremely relevant to our research.

UNDEFINED BORDERS Providing support for sabotage, subversion, and liberation movements in Africa, Middle East, Asia and South America has always been and will remain standard procedures. Nevertheless, murder and torture are perpetuated as strategies in ethnic and tribal conflicts in African countries while common intelligence activities are marginalized.

UNDEFINED CATEGORIES The boundary between friends and enemies is always unclear, as is unambiguously demonstrated by the fact that under particular historical circumstances enemies have shown more respectful behavior than allies.

UNSTABLE BORDERS It has also been proven that the line between right and

wrong is unsubstantial in the framework of illegal operations due to the fact that the license to eliminate those considered a danger to national security is a far from unusual operative procedure.

VIOLATIONS It is not uncommon for intelligence agencies to ignore rules of the Constitution or the restrictions imposed by their certificate of incorporation. International law, for example, is not valid and cannot be applied to covert actions.

VULNERABILITY The psychological stress undergone by analysts and agents so significant to the undermining of an intelligence's organization cannot be denied.

WEAKNESS The mistrust of intelligence service by diplomatic personnel must be

quickly set aside, especially in European countries where security measures at consulates and embassies are weak or nonexistent.

WITHOUT NETWORK Agents who operate in counter-intelligence activities abroad and must face unexpected and serious difficulties cannot always rely on adequate diplomatic and political protection because they have no networks. Furthermore, counter-intelligence operation can only be extended in terms of time (and often in terms of space).

WORN-OUT LINES Unlike as in the past, open sources regarding foreign policy, geopolitics, military and economics intelligence are often more circumstantial and thorough than secret sources.

The CESTUDEC Association founded in 2011 is based in Como. The President is Prof. Giuseppe Gagliano; the Vice-President is Colonel Mario Pietrangeli. CESTUDEC is a non-profit association that promotes the greater acquisition of knowledge and public awareness of military history and strategic sciences through cooperation with government ministries, regional authorities, universities, other organizations and institutions, Italian and international research institutes, private companies, and civilians.

Web site: <http://centrostudistrategicarlodecristoforis.com/>

E-mail: cestudec@gmail.com